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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD
The finality of the decisions of the Comptroller General of the
United States on questions involving the interpretation of appropria-
tion acts of Congress presents one of the major unsolved problems in
American administrative law. It is, indeed, one aspect of the larger
and equally unsolved governmental problem in this country, too
large to be treated here, of the control of fiscal policy. In view of the
scale of federal expenditures now being undertaken, and of the in-
creases in taxation which they promise for the none too distant
future, it is reasonable to suppose that the whole question of what
governmental arrangements, of structure and of power, will be
needed to provide a satisfactory system of control, will soon engage
national attention.' The literature of fiscal control, though recent, is
already voluminous and the time is ripening for a reconsideration of
the problem. While students of it are by no means in agreement on
the most desirable remedy, enough has been done, and our national
experience makes it clear, that a really adequate reconsideration
must go back of present practices and present statutes and call into
question the continued usefulness, in that field, of such a sacred cow
as the constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. This paper
is not so ambitious. Accepting our present constitutional arrange-
ments as given, it will attempt to point out the present status of the
Comptroller General's powers, for the light that that may cast on
the general problem.
2
That status at present is ambiguous. If we look at the acts of Con-
gress defining his powers, especially in the light of their history, there
IA recent monograph, short but suggestive, on the organization of auditing
control is G. C. S. BENSON, FINANCIAL CONTROL AND INTEGRATION (1934); and see
bibliography there given, pp. 60-65.
2Cf. BENSON, op. cit. supra note I, c. 3, 4; W. E. HOTCHKISS, THE JUDICIAL
WORK OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY (1911); W. F. WILLOUGHBY, THE
LEGAL STATUS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (1927); D.
H. SMITE, THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (Institute for Government Re-
search, Service Monograph No. 46, 1927); A. G. LANGELUTTIG, THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES (1927), ch. 13; ANN. REPS. COMP. GEN., for
fiscal years 1922 to 1932 (none published since 1932); 0. R. McGuire, The Ac-
counting Officers of the United States and Judicial Precedents, (1925) 19 ILL. L.
REv. 523, and Legislative or Executive Control over Accounting for Federal Funds,
(1926) 20 ILL. L. REV. 455; A. G. Langeluttig, Legal Status of the Comptroller Gen-
eral of the United States, (1929) 23 ILL. L. REV. 556. Mr. McGuire's conclusions
reflect the fact that he is a counsel in the General Accounting Office.
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is an apparently clear answer as to what these powers ought to be;
and the present Comptroller General has labored zealously to make
that picture correspond with reality.3 If we review the practice of the
administrative officers, however, we find a picture that, though less
clear, does not in important ways correspond to the statutory con-
ception. And if we review the judicial review of the subject, the pic-
ture becomes still less clear but the tendency is not in the direction
of confirming the lines of the statutory grant to the Comptroller
General. The Supreme Court has not as yet spoken directly to the
issue, but in a case decided last year, Miguel v. McCarl,4 it came
measurably nearer doing so. It now appears that, despite the statutes,
payments may be made which he thinks are unauthorized, and the
executive departments will undoubtedly take advantage of that
situation to increase their freedom of action. If experience is any
guide they will use it to liberalize their expenditures, and the in-
tegrity of the present system of control may be jeopardized. A break-
down is not necessarily imminent, particularly in view of the attitude
of President Roosevelt,5 but the logical extension of the doctrine of
the Miguel case will produce an unworkable result if carried through.
The difficulty lies in the inherent conflict between the separation
of powers which theoretically gives control of spending to Congress,
and the felt need of the executive, with the mounting responsibility
for spending that it has, for a freer hand in determining questions of
detail in the use of appropriations. Under the separation of powers
implied in our existing constitutional arrangements, it is supposedly
Congress that holds the purse strings,6 while the executive performs
the actual disbursing and the courts stand in the background, armed
with John Marshall's potent phrase, that "it is, emphatically, the
province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law
is." If the responsibility for spending lies entirely with Congress, it
seems altogether proper that that body should insist, through an
agent answerable to it alone, upon limiting expenditures strictly to
3J. R. McCarl, a former secretary to Senator Norris, is the only incumbent the
office has had. For some description of his activities see SMITH, op. cit. supra note
2, at 66-72 and C.2, and ANN. REPS. ComP. GEN.
429I U. S. 442 (1934), discussed infra; see note, (1934) 22 GEo. L. J. 654.
5Despite the Comptroller General's refusal last year to release funds for estab-
lishing forest belts in drought areas, practical cooperation between him and the
President is reliably reported to be greater than during any previous administra-
tion since 192 1. See infra note 38.
6Art I, § 8 (i): "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes . .. to
pay the debts. . . of the United States." Art. I, § 9 (7): "No money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law...
But who "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed"?
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objects designated in its appropriations.7 To be effective this must be
accomplished not merely by a paper audit which reviews and pub-
lishes the details of income and outgo (wholesome though that might
be in default of anything more), but by a power of disallowing all
items not found by that agent to be authorized. If injustice or hard-
ship results, the matter can be brought by the claimant directly, or
through that other Congressional agent, the Court of Claims, or by
the executive through the budget, to the attention of Congress,
whose power is plenary and whose intentions are benevolent. In this
way, honest spending can proceed, and frugality will be encouraged.
On the other hand, we do not need the testimony of veterans'
legislation or the restoration of the pay cuts provided in the Economy
Act of 1933 to know that Congress is not always moved primarily
by a desire for economical use of public moneys, and frequently seems
anxious to be told how more money might be spent.8 And within the
executive, a similar conflict of motives is apparent, where economy
or the letter of appropriation acts stands in the way of what is deemed
to be an effective administrative policy. 9 Although recourse to Con-
7Not, of course, to objects desired by taxpayers. There is no cure in the General
Accounting Office for logrolling, and no complete cure for ambiguous legislative
drafting, though the technique of the latter has improved markedly.
80ne index of this is the relative importance attached by Congressmen to
membership on the committees on Appropriations and on Expenditures in the
Executive Establishments.
9One form of executive escape from accounting control, which is excluded from
detailed discussion by the scope of this article, may be noted here. During the
World War a number of government-owned corporations were established to fur-
ther various war activities-notably the U. S. Shipping Board Merchant Fleet
Corp., the U. S. Grain Corp., and the War Finance Corp.-whose operations were
not made subject to the Comptroller of the Treasury in order "to enable them to
employ commercial methods and to conduct their operations with a freedom sup-
posed to be inconsistent with accountability to the Treasury under its established
procedure of audit and control over the financial transactions of the United
States." United States ex rel. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. 1 (1927).
ANN. REp. CoMp. GEN., 1928, 9-18. This precedent was followed in the establish-
ment of the R. F. C., (Act of Jan. 22, 1932, §§ 4, 14; 47 STAT. 5, 6, 11 (1932); see
ANN. REP. CoMP. GEN., 1932, 13-18), and of a number of other corporations set up
under the Roosevelt administration. As to the latter, the situation was cured by
Executive Order 6549, Jan. 3, 1934, which provided that ".... all receipts and
expenditures by governmental agencies, including corporations, created after
March 3, 1933, the accounting procedure for which is not otherwise prescribed
by law, shall be rendered to the General Accounting Office in such manner, to
such extent, and at such times as the Comptroller General of the United States
may prescribe, for settlement and adjustment .. ." The R. F. C., created before
March 3, 1933, was not included in this order and remains in control of its own
accounting.
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gress may be open (it often is not), and whether the motive is legiti-
mate or not, the temptation is usually irresistible to secure the result
more swiftly and surely by interpretation of an existing appropria-
tion. The temptation is increased by the knowledge that, despite
the separation of powers, the executive in fact is largely instrumental
in making as well as carrying out policies, fiscal and otherwise, and is
held responsible by the country for doing so.' 0 The greatest-hope for
prudent spending in the future lies evidently in the further develop-
ment of executive control over Congress through the budget, and the
more nearly appropriations conform to proposals of the Budget
Bureau, the more apparent this becomes. Since it would be too much
to expect that two independent branches of the government should
see eye to eye, it is inevitable that a zealous Comptroller General
acting upon a strict application of the theory of the separation of
powers and of the letter of the law should do many things that to the
departments concerned seem an unwarranted interference with their
powers and responsibilities for efficient administration. And so he has.
Although the Comptroller General's grip is strong through his hold on
the mechanics of disbursements, it is possible in some situations to
appeal to the courts instead of to Congress, and thus to present to
them various aspects of the clash of public policies. Inevitably, it is
seldom possible to present to them the picture entire, so that the
decisions received reflect the emphasis of the particular elements
involved and little consistent policy results. Like the munitions
makers, the decisions supply ammunition to both sides.
Turning first to the statutes, the legislative history of the General
Accounting Office is well known and need be sketched only briefly."
After some early efforts with a more decentralized scheme that proved
inadequate to meet the strain imposed by the War of 1812, Congress
in 18:17 established a central control in the Treasury, exercised by
two Comptrollers and several Auditors, and provided 2
"that... all claims and demands whatever, by the United
States or against them, and all accounts whatever, in which
the United States are concerned... shall be settled and adjusted
in the Treasury Department."
Since every voucher paid had to be reviewed in the department
"Increasingly, Congressional candidates campaign for office on a platform of
"supporting the President", while a President running for re-election points to the
legislation he has already had enacted, and promises more if re-elected. Cf. D. W.
BROGAN, GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE (1933).
"See esp. SMITH, op. cit. supra note 2, C. i; McGuire, Legislative or Executive
Control, etc. (1926) 20 ILL. L. REV. 455 ff.
"23 STAT. 366 (1817).
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where it originated as well as in the Treasury, often three or four
times, the steadily increasing volume of business placed such a burden
of mechanical calculations upon the Comptrollers and their staff that
the audit lagged years behind current transactions and became
ineffective, 13 as the famous Swartwout defalcation demonstrated.
14
In the meantime, as will be noted, conflicting interpretations by
Attorneys General and by the courts, together with the possibility
of executive pressure from the President, left it doubtful whether the
settlement in the Treasury contemplated by the 1817 Act was
conclusively in the hands of the Comptroller, or whether he was
obliged to follow opinions of the Attorney General. Congress adhered
to its view of its constitutional powers by enacting in i868 that the
Act of 181715
"shall not be construed to authorize the heads of departments
to change or modify the balances that may be certified to them
by the... Comptroller of the Treasury, but that such balances,
when stated by the auditor and properly certified by the comp-
troller as piovided by that act, shall be taken and considered
as final and conclusive upon the executive branch of the govern-
ment, and be subject to review only by Congress or the proper
courts..."
Furthermore, when in 1870 the Department of Justice was estab-
lished, the general provision that "each head of any Department of
13HOTCHKISS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 17-18; cf. McKnight v. United States,
13 Ct. C1. 292,299 ff. (1877).
I4Cf. VON HOLST, CONsT. HIST. OF THE U. S. (1888) II, 349 ff., and House Doe.
No. 13, 25th. Cong., 3d. sess., p. 6.
15I5 STAT. 54 (1868). The Committee on the Revision of Laws of the House of
Representatives at the next session considered and rejected a letter from the
Secretary of War suggesting the repeal of this law, and in a report to the House
on Feb. i6, 1869 [reprinted 26 CONG. REC. 4341-4342, in connection with the
consideration of the Dockery Act, 28 STAT. 205 (1894)], reviewed the Comp-
troller's experience under the previous legislation. An excerpt gives the gist:
"It appears to the committee that this assumption of power in the head of
the War or any other Department to set aside and change the findings of the
accounting officers of the Government is at war with the whole principle up-
on which the system is based; that the allowance and settlement of the dis-
bursement of all public funds should be vested wholly in a set of officers other
and different from those who made the expenditure. If their allowances and
settlements can be set aside and changed by the head of the Departments
under whose direction the money was paid, or the claim accrued, then the
whole system of checks to improper expenditure, which it was supposed had
been established, falls to the ground.
"Aside from this consideration, the committee believe that the just rights
of the Government itself, as well as the rights of claimants against the
Government, are much more likely to be preserved, by being subject to the
examination and adjudication of experienced men accustomed to examining
accounts and weighing evidence, than they would be if subject to revisal and
reversal by the subordinates in another Department, selected with no view
to qualifications of this character."
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the Government may require the opinion of the Attorney-General
on all question of law arising in the administration of their respective
Departments", was accompanied by the specific statement, 6
"That whenever a question of law arises in the administration,
either of the War or Navy Department, the cognizance of which
is- not given by statute to some other officer from whom the
head of either of these Departments may require advice, the
same shall be sent to the Attorney-General. .."
-a limitation on the Attorney General apparently designed to
recognize the finality of the Comptroller's decisions on legal points
involved in settling accounts in those departments. 7 Although the
present Comptroller General asserts that'8
"it has been the practice... of the Comptrollers followed with-
out interruption, at least since the act of March 30, 1868 ...,
to decide every question of law and of fact necessary to be de-
cided in determining whether a payment on a claim is authorized
to be made under appropriated moneys of the United States,
except in those rare cases where the Congress, by specific lan-
guage, has made the finding or decision of some other official
conclusive in that respect",
it seems also to be clear that Comptrollers continued to acquiesce in,
and sometimes to join in requests for, opinions of the Attorneys
General. Not until 1894 was there a thorough-going reorganization
by the Dockery Act,19 which devolved the administrative work upon
16Act of June 22, 1870, 16 STAT. 162. The office of Attorney General, without
the Department under him, had been in existence since the Judiciary Act of 1789.
17A limitation, however, that was soon forgotten, perhaps in part because of the
rearrangement of these provisions in the Revised Statutes. Whereas in Section 6 of
the Act of 1870 the specific provision regarding the rendering of advice to the War
and Navy departments had come first, followed by the more general one regarding
the head of "any Department", the order of sentences was reversed in the revision
and the two clauses became separate sections, 356 and 357 of the Revised Statutes,
so that the more general one seemed to make the other nugatory.
18Miguel v. McCarl, supra note 4, Brief for Comptroller General, on writ of
certiorari, p. 7.
1928 STAT. 205 (i894). To clarify the independence of the Comptroller, section 8
provided:
"The balances which may from time to time be certified by the Auditors
to the Division of Bookkeeping and Warrants, . .. shall be final and con-
clusive upon the Executive Branch of the Government, except that any per-
son whose accounts may have been settled, the head of the Executive
Department, or the board, commission, or establishment... to which the
account pertains, or the Comptroller of the Treasury, may, within a year,
obtain a revision of the said account by the Comptroller of the Treasury,
whose decision upon such revision shall be final and conclusive upon the
Executive Branch of the Government: Provided, That the Secretary of the
Treasury may, when in his judgment the interests of the Government require
it, suspend payment and direct the reexamination of any account."
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Auditors and left a single Comptroller with an appellate review, thus
freeing him to devote his time to legal interpretations mainly. The
Act reiterated that the decisions of the Comptroller "shall be final
and conclusive upon the Executive branch of the Government", and
legalized what had become the practice in order to avoid hardship
upon disbursing officers, that the latter might ask the Comptroller
for an advance decision on the legality of a payment, which opinion
should thereafter bind the Comptroller.0
Since the Attorneys General, after a short lapse, resumed the prac-
tice of rendering opinions on accounting matters, Congress in the
Budget and Accounting Act of 192 ,21 attempted a more far-reaching
remedy by pushing the doctrine of the separation of powers to its
logical conclusion. The offices of Comptroller and Auditors of the
Treasury were abolished and their duties transferred to a new inde-
pendent establishment, the General Accounting Office, headed by
a Comptroller General, not subject to the control of any department
head and answerable onlr to Congress. To protect him against the
President he was given a fifteen year term,2 and made irremovable
except by a joint resolution (which requires the President's signature)
and for specified causes only.2 Significant provisions of the Act in-
clude the statement that the powers of the Comptroller Genera2 4
"shall ... be exercised without direction from any other officer.
The balances certified by the Comptroller General shall be final
and conclusive upon the executive branch of the Government."
And by Section 305,
".... All claims and demands whatever by the Government of the
United States or against it, and all accounts whatever in which
201bid.
21Act of June I0, 1921 , 42 STAT. 24; 31 U. S. C. A. 44.
reSection 303, a compromise between the views of those who, like the present
Vice-President, then Congressman Garner, favored a life term comparable to that
of the judiciary, and others who wanted it much shorter.
nPresident Wilson vetoed a similar act the previous year which provided for re-
moval only by concurrent resolution (which does not require the President's signa-
ture), on the ground that it was an unconstitutional limitation on the President's
removal power. Cf. infra note 37. Obviously the Act, as passed and signed by
President Harding, by no means meets this objection: the initiative in removal
remains with Congress according to the statute.
24Section 3o4. A weakness in the drafting of the Act, however, which was done
by a subordinate of the Comptroller of the Treasury, will be seen in the use of
language quoted from previous statutes and a general provision in Sec. 304 that
"All powers and duties now conferred or imposed by law upon the Comp-
troller of the Treasury ... shall, so far as not inconsistent with this Act, be
vested in and imposed upon the General Accounting Office..."
Disputed interpretations of authority and finality under the earlier acts could
thus be carried over to the new regime instead of being explicitly clarified.
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the Government of the United States is concerned, either as
debtor or creditor, shall be settled and adjusted in the General
Accounting Office."
As clearly, then, as Congress knew how to say it, this Act provided
for the finality of the Comptroller General's decisions except for
review in Congress itself, or in the courts.
Nevertheless, the experience of administrative practice does not
bear out this statutory design. Although Attorney General Wirt inter-
preted the Act of 1817 to require the accounting officers to act with-
out direction from any other executive officer,25 he was reversed by
his successors,26 who were apparently impressed by the superior rank
and dignity of the Attorney General's office, and declined to be bound
by the interpretation of a subordinate in another department. From
these conflicting doctrines subsequent department heads might
choose, and did. Even after the Act of i868, Attorneys General con-
tinued to render opinions on matters within the Comptroller's juris-
diction,2 7 though they sometimes declined2 8 to do so unless the Comp-
troller joined in the request for the opinion, as he occasionally did.
29
It must be remembered that the Comptrollers and Auditors had
indefinite terms of office, and were therefore a part of the party
patronage to be changed after each election. An occasional Comp-
troller might assert his independence and refuse to be bound by
opinions of the Attorney General or decisions of the Court of Claims ;310
and an occasional President might decline to interfere with a Comp-
troller's decision on the ground that by the law that decision was
final.31 But the threat once used by President Cleveland was always
present in the background, that if the President could not change the
Comptroller's opinion, he could change the Comptroller.32 On the
2i OPs. ATTY. GEN. 624, 636, 705, 706 (1823-24-25). Taney and Crittenden
shared his view, 2 Ops. ATTY. GEN. 508 (1832); 3 id. 635 (1841).
26By Atty. Gen. Berrien first, 2 Os. ATTY. GEN. 302 (1829); later by Butler, 2
id. 652 (1834); and by Black, 9 id. 32 (1857).
2717 OPS. ATTY. GEN. 41,43,390 (1881-82); 19 id. 567 (1890).
2821 Ops. ATTY. GEN. 178, 188, 530 (1895-97); 22 id. 581 (1899); 23 id. 1, 468
(1899, 1901); 24 id. 553 (1902); 25 id. 8I (19o3).
2917 Ops. ATTY. GEN. 152, 425, 461, 603 (i881-82-83); 21 id. I8I, 224, 402
(1895-96). Cf. LANGELUTTIG, op. cit. supra note 2, at I59-60; HOTCHKISS, Op. cit.
supra note 2, at 24-29.
3OCf. HOTCHKISS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 32.
BIAs Andrew Jackson did in response to protest on the part of War Department
contractors. Brief for Comptroller General in Miguel v. McCarl (supra note 4) pp.
47-49, n. io.
nWILLOUGHBY, LEGAL STATUS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE (1927), 4. Cf. ANN. REP. COMP. OF THE TREAS., 1911, p. 9-
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other hand, it should also be remembered, as a partial offset, that
the bulk of the work was so great and so detailed that only in excep-
tional instances could the Comptroller be directly interfered with; his
office became in fact a separate branch of the Treasury.33
The language of the Dockery Act in 1894 seemed so unequivocal
that for a time Attorneys General refused to give opinions on matters
in the Comptroller's province, unless on "matters of great impor-
tance".'4 The notion of what was included in this reservation grad-
ually expanded, however, so that during the World War, the Comp-
troller again found his authority impaired.35 No neater commentary
on a "government of laws and not of men" could be provided than
this century of effort by Congress to vest legal finality, so far as the
executive branch was concerned, in the decisions of a subordinate in
one department as against the heads of other departments.
The changes made by the Budget and Accounting Act have un-
doubtedly strengthened enormously the Comptroller General's
supervision of the spending habits of the executive officers, as is
attested by the nearly universal resentment expressed against him
in the departments3 -possibly a wholesome result. And for the pre-
sent at least, the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act de-
signed to withdraw him from the President's removal power, in the
light of Myers v. United States,3 7 is a matter of academic interest
nHoTcHKiss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 24.
342I Ops. ATTY. GEN. 178, 182, I88, 4o5 (1895-96); 22 id. 581 (1899); 23 id. 468,
586 (190I); 24 id. 85, 553, 614 (1902-03); 26 id. 431 (1907). It was this period of a
dozen years following the Dockery Act when the Comptroller's independence was
at a peak that Hotchkiss chiefly dealt with, which explains his tendency to
magnify that independence.
nSee 31 Ops. ATTY. GEN. 173 (1917), where the decision of the Comptroller
regarding a naval officer's pay in 24 CoMP. DEc. 163 (917) was reviewed and a
different conclusion reached. On the basis of this, large sums were improperly paid
out until decisions of the Court of Claims, 59 Ct. Cl. 224, 919 (1924); 6o id. 1o3o
(1925), upheld the Comptroller's interpretation. The matter is reviewed in detail
in 4 COMp. GEN. 636 (1925).
36Cf. BENSON, op. cit. supra note I, at 36.
37272 U. S. 52 (1926). The legal issue seems to turn upon whether the Comp-
troller General is to be regarded as an "executive officer", as contended by Solici-
tor General Beck, or solely an "agent of Congress," as Willoughby argues, op. cit.
supra note 2 at 12-16. The broad conclusions of the Myers case have just been
sharply restricted by the somewhat surprising decision in Rathbun v. United
States, 55 Sup. Ct. 869 (1935), denying the President's power to remove a Federal
Trade Commissioner except in accordance with the statutory provisions. This
seems to cover the Comptroller General's status as well. Id. at 875. Langeluttig,
contradicting McGuire, Willoughby and Smith, had asserted that the Comp-
troller General is an administrative officer, removable by the President. Legal
Status of the Comptroller General, (1929) 23 ILL. L. REv. 556 at 578.
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mainly; it is most unlikely that such a removal will be attempted. 8
But the Act did not settle the question of jurisdiction between the
Comptroller General and the Attorney General.39 For several years
now this question has remained in hopeless deadlock. The effect
has spread to the departments, some of which have entirely refused
to follow certain orders of the Comptroller General regarding account-
ing procedure, while others have acquiesced. The latest incident of
the kind to attract public attention is the refusal of the Secretary of
the Navy to be bound by a decision of the Comptroller General that
appropriations are not available to pay the travel expenses of de-
pendents of naval officers ordered home from a foreign station to
await retirement orders, and the Secretary's announced intention
of ordering such payments, in reliance on opinions of the Attorney
General and decisions of the Court of Claims, the Comptroller
General to the contrary notwithstanding. 40 Notoriously, the War and
Navy Departments have been least cooperative with the govern-
ment's accounting officers.
The position of the Comptroller General in relation to the federal
courts presents somewhat different considerations, but with respect
to the problem of the control of fiscal policy, the chief desideratum,
as in the case of the executive, is essentially the same, i. e., to provide
a single centralized channel of authority through which claims against
the United States, and the legal extent of the authority of executive
officers to. spend, can be determined. The present system does not
afford that centralization.
38Despite some loose newspaper talk there is no reason to suppose anything of
the sort is imminent now. The present incumbent's term expires next year, and
under the law he is ineligible for reappointment. An attempted removal would
surely solidify opposition in Congress to the granting of lump sum appropriations
in the future, and would be a vulnerable target for political attack. See supra
note 5.
39in 33 Ops. ATTY. GEN. 265 (1922), Attorney General Daugherty declined to
intervene, but in 33 id. 383 (1922) he upheld the War Department's protest
against regulations requiring the payment of transportation accounts directly
in the General Accounting Office. The Comptroller General, disregarding this,
put the regulations in force anyhow. Some departments obeyed, others refused,
and there the matter rests. Similarly, Attorney General Stone sided with the
Navy Department in Bullard, Adm. v. United States, 34 Ors. ATTv. GEN. 346
(1924); 66 Ct. Cl. 264 (1928); cf. LANGELUTTIG, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 162-172.
40See letter of Comptroller General to Secretary of the Navy, Feb. 27, 1935.
N. Y. Sun, March 6, 1935; Washington Star, and Washington Post, March 5,
1935; N. Y. Times, March 9, 1935. A lively discussio9 illustrating Congressional
viewpoints, together with the documents, will be found in the House Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Naval Appropriations, 74th. Cong., Ist. sess., 838-
880 (1935).
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Prior to 1855 when the Court 6f Claims was established4' (or really,
to 1863, when its powers Were strengthened),4 unsuccessful claimants
before the Comptrollers h d no other regular recourse than to Con-
gress. Since that time, a direct legal remedy has been available, both
as to contract and as to pay claims. The remedy was improved by
the Tucker Act in 1887,43 which also gave concurrent jurisdiction to
the District Courts on amounts less than $io,ooo. The jurisdiction
of these courts as to decisions of the Comptrollers, however, as
Hotchkiss has remarked, "is not so much appellate as it is parallel
and independent." 44 They have felt free to reverse his decisions, 45 and
Congress has almost without exceptionla appropriated for their judg-
ments. The Comptrollers, for their part, though they are bound to
certify payments on such judgments, have shown themselves equally
free to ignore these same judgments as precedents-with a good deal
of practical justification.41 Particularly is this true of the Comp-
troller General. The concurrent jurisdiction granted led to a contra-
riety of interpretations; the Court of Claims often reversed itself,
and has been often reversed by the Supreme Court. More important,
the conduct of the government's defense in all federal courts is com-
mitted to the Attorney General, a task for which, in these cases,
the Comptroller not unnaturally conceives himself to be better fitted;
and the decision whether to prosecute appeals from adverse rulings
4io STAT. 612. 4212 STAT. 765.
4324 STAT. 505. 4Op. cit. supra note 2, at 32.
45The Bullard case, supra note 39, is one of the conspicuous recent instances.
The Comptroller General felt that the judgment against the Government in this
case (travel expenses of the wife of Admiral Bullard when he was ordered home
from China to await retirement) resulted from the failure of the Attorney General
to allow him to appear before the Court of Claims to defend the suit. Although he
was obliged to certify payment under an appropriation following the judgment, he
has declined to regard the case as a binding precedent, in the light of United
States v. Phisterer, 94 U. S. 219 (1876). "..It is such things that sometimes
render judgments given by the Court of Claims of little assistance in the solving
of questions for decision by this office and relating not to matters still to be con-
sidered by the Congress but to actual use of an existing appropriation, and in
view of its responsibility to check unlawful uses of appropriations this office must,
of course, determine for itself when decisions of inferior courts are safe as guides
in determining similar questions coming before this office for decision.. ."Letter
of Comp. Gen. to Secy. of the Navy, Feb. 27, 1935.
41aTwo recent exceptions are Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United
States, 69 Ct. Cl. 91 (1930); 73 id. 447 (1932); 76 id. 334 (1932); and Dalton v.
United States, 71 Ct. Cl. 421 (1931).
463 FIRST CoMP. DEC., Introd., p. xxxix (1882); cf. In re Sugar Bounty, 2 COMP.
DEC. 98 (1895); United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427, I6 Sup. Ct. 1120
(1896), discussed in HoTcHEIss, op. cit. supra note 2, at 34; and the Bullard case,
Supra note 45.
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lies also with the Attorney General. The Comptroller has seldom been
permitted to appear in the Court of Claims and has frequently been
overruled when he has urged an appeal.47 This is an acute source of
grievance to the Comptroller General and he has therefore used de-
cisions of the Court, in matters within his competence, as any litigant
would: to be cited when they support him, and to be distinguished or
ignored when they do not. Only decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States are treated as binding precedents in his office.
Another source of confusion lies in Section 148 of the Judicial
Code, which authorizes department heads to refer claims pending in
their departments to the Court of Claims for opinion or adjudica-
tion.43 This form of appeal from his decisions by department heads
to the Court of Claims instead of to Congress is a peculiar irritation
to the Comptroller General, inviting direct conflict between him and
the Court. It is the more aggravating because if the matter is brought
to the Court by the claimant himself, as is his right also,49 the Crimi-
nal Code forbids any officer in the government from aiding the prose-
cution of the claim in any way.5" By the device of departmental
reference the claimant and the department may join forces and the
Comptroller General may not be heard in opposition to justify his
own adverse decision. This situation seems indefensible.
. In addition to these legal remedies, there is equitable relief against
the Comptroller General by mandamus"' and injunction. The develop-
ment and scope of mandamus as applied to the Comptroller General
is not to be understood without reference to the powers and practices
of his predecessors, the Comptrollers of the Treasury. In this as in
other fields, the law has not been constructed in a vacuum, nor
4 7 LANGELUTTIG, op. cit. supra note 2, at 172-174, and (1929) 23 ILL. L. REV.
556 at 563. For the Comptroller General's activities in collecting debts by means
short of suits see infra note 62, and BENSON, op. cit. supra note I at 25.
4822 STAT. 485 (1883); 24 STAT. 507 (1887); 36 STAT. 1137 (19xi). The Court
of Claims has held that this does not give it jurisdiction of questions within the
jurisdiction of the accounting officers. In re Proposed Reference by the Secretary
of the Navy, 53 Ct. Cl. 370 (1918); In re Departmental Reference No. 167, 59 Ct.
Cl. 813 (1924). But it is not clear that the two see eye to eye on what that juris-
diction is. A departmental reference was pending in the Miguel v. McCarl case
when the mandamus proceedings were brought. See infra.
410regon-Washington R. R. & N. Co. v. United States, 54 Ct. Cl. 131, 138, i39
(i919); St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. United States, 268 U. S. 169, 174 (1925).
50§§ 109, 113 Criminal Code (i909), i8 U. S. C. A. §§ 198, 203 (1926); § 19o, Rev.
Stat. (878), 5 U. S. C.'A. §99 (1926); Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 344
(i9o6); Tyler's Motion, 18 Ct. Cl. 25 (1883); In re Winthrop, 31 Ct. Cl. 35 (1895);
Case v. Helwig, 65 F. (2d) x86 (App. D. C. 1933).
5°SLittle distinction has been made in this field between mandamus and man-
datory injunction. Cf. LANGELUTTIG, op. cit. supra note 37, at 564-577.
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evolved by pure reason. For a generation after the unsuccessful
attempt in Marbury v. Madison5" to secure mandamus against a
federal official to compel performance of an alleged duty, the question
was in abeyance. But in Kendall v. Stokes 2 in 1838, the Court after
careful consideration held that the Circuit Court for the District of
Columbia, alone among federal courts, could order the Postmaster
General to perform a ministerial duty. This seemed to point the way
to a new approach by claimants against the government who got
no satisfaction from department heads. But in the leading case of
Decatur v. Paulding"3 in 1840, and in Brashear v. Mason" and U. S.
ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie,", the denial of writs of mandamus to
collect claims against Secretaries of the Navy and of the Treasury
was affirmed. Kendall v. Stokes was distinguished by calling the con-
struction of the statutes involved in the later cases not ministerial
but discretionary. It is significant that in all these cases the executive
spoke with undivided voice, nor was there any "agent of Congress" to
interpose. In practice the accounting officers were not independent
of executive control on matters of general policy and the courts were
51iCranch 137 (18o3).
521 2 Pet. 524 (1838). On the ground that the courts of the District not only had
the statutory powers given by Congress but also inherited the general jurisdiction
of the Maryland courts of that area, which included mandamus.
53The widow of Commodore Stephen Decatur claimed two pensions under a
general and a special act of Congress, both passed the same day. Offered her
choice, but not both, by the Secretary of the Navy, who acted upon the advice of
the Attorney General, she took the larger under protest and sought mandamus
against the Secretary to get the other too, alleging a ministerial duty to carry out
both acts. This was denied, and on appeal the Supreme Court, sharply divided in
reasoning though not in conclusion, upheld the Circuit Court. Chief Justice
Taney in the prevailing opinion, without passing on the merits, said that the
construction of the statutes here was not ministerial but involved discretion
"of a high order".
"6 How. 92 (1848). Mandamus to collect pay of an officer of the navy (sic)
of the Republic of Texas who claimed to have been covered into the United States
navy by the joint resolution annexing Texas. Mr. Justice Nelson stated the issue
clearly and with prophetic insight:
"It will not do to say, that the result of the proceeding by mandamus
would show the title of the relator to his pay, the amount -and whether
there were any moneys in the treasury applicable to the demand; for, upon
this ground, any creditor of the government would be enabled to enforce his
claim against it, through the head of the proper department, by means of
this writ, and the proceeding by mandamus would become as common, in
the enforcement of demands upon the government, as the action of assumpsit
to enforce like demands against individuals." (p. 102)
5517 How. 284 (1854). Suit to recover salary, refused by the Comptroller, for
the remainder of the term of a judge of the territorial court of Minnesota who
had been removed by the President. In argument and in the dissent of McLean,
J., the removal power was elaborately discussed.
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not prepared to intervene in the spending mechanism. A hint that
this might not always be so, however, where executive judgment was
divided, may be seen in United States v. Jones.
"56
"The secretary of the navy represents the President, and
exercises his power on the subjects confided to his department.
He is responsible to the people and the law for any abuse of the
powers intrusted to him. His acts and decisions, on subjects sub-
mitted to his jurisdiction and control by the constitution and
laws, do not require the approval of any officer of another depart-
ment to make them valid and conclusive. The accounting officers
of the treasury have not the burden of responsibility cast upon
them of revising the judgments, correcting the supposed mis-
takes, or annulling the orders of the heads of departments."
It was in response to this that the Act of 1868 made the certifications
of the Comptroller "conclusive upon the executive branch". 57 In i8go
for the first time, a mandamus case against the accounting officers
directly was carried to the Supreme Court, which again denied relief
in United States ex rel. Lisle v. Lynch:5 8
"The contention of the relator is that the interpretation he puts
upon the Act is too obviously correct to admit of dispute and
that this court has so decided; but it does not follow, because the
decision of the Comptroller and Auditor may have been erro-
neous, that the assertion of relator to that effect raises a cogni-
zable controversy as to their authority to proceed at all. What
the relator sought was an order coercing these officers to proceed
in a particular way, and this order the Supreme Court of the
District declined to grant .... Why the relator did not bring
suit in the Court of Claims does not appear... "
Such was the situation before the Dockery Act gave the accounting
officers a considerable degree of independence.
The turning point in the development came with Smith v. Jackson.59
A Treasury Auditor for the Canal Zone, backed by the Comptroller
5618 How. 92, 95 (1855). This was a suit by the Government (not a mandamus
proceeding) to recover money sent by order of the Secretary of the Navy to a
naval officer abroad, which was disallowed by the accounting officer despite an
opinion of the Attorney General. Denial of recovery was affirmed. The quota-
tion is given for its tone of voice. It completely begs the question of the "subjects
submitted to his jurisdiction by the constitution and laws."
57Supra note i. "8137 U. S. 280 (189o).
59246 U. S. 388 (1918), affirming 241 Fed. 747 (1917) where the opinion of the
District Court is printed and adopted by the Circuit Court of Appeals. On its
facts this was evidently the worst possible case that could have been chosen for an
appeal to test the Comptroller's powers. The remarks here quoted from Chief
Justice White are the only known expression of the Court's views as to the binding
character of opinions of the Attorney General. LANGELUTTIG, op. cit. supra note 2,
at 155.
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but in disregard of an opinion of the Attorney General,6" deducted
from the salary of the District Judge for the Canal Zone the estimated
value of government living quarters previously furnished free. The
judge sued for mandamus in his own court to compel the payment of
his salary undiminished. A District Judge had to be sent from Ala-
bama to hear the case, and in an exhaustively lengthy decision, he
granted the writ. Not content, the Auditor carried the case through
the Circuit Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, and there re-
ceived a stinging rebuke. Chief Justice White called the appeal "a
plain abuse of administrative discretion" and said that the Auditor
"had no power to refuse to carry out the law and that any doubt
which he might have had should have been subordinated, first,
to the ruling of the Attorney General and, second, beyond all
possible question to the judgments of the courts below."ha
It was shortly after this that the Comptroller General's office was
created and fortified by the Congressional direction that his powers
"shall... be exercised without direction from any other officer.
' 61
With his crusading determination to sweep clean the corners of
executive expenditure, the stage was set for increased resort to the
courts. It came. When the Comptroller General attempted to recover
allowances paid unlawfully, as he thought, to naval and military
officers for dependents by docking their pay, a series of District Court
decisions granting mandamus against him followed,2 on the au-
thority of Smith v. Jackson. It is a curious fact that the jurisdiction
of district courts outside the District of Columbia to issue mandamus
to a federal officer was apparently not even raised in any of these
cases, although it lay at the threshold of the action taken in all of
them.63 However, the Attorney General declined to prosecute appeals
6034 Ops. ATTY. GEN. 517 (1925).
60%246 U. S. at 39o-391. 6 lSupra note 24.
62Dillon v. Groos, 299 Fed. 851 (1924); Howe v. Elliott, 3oo Fed. 243 (1924);
Ware v. Alexander, 2 F. (2d) 895 (1924); Wylly v. McCarl, 2 F. (2d) 897 (1924).
Contra: Barber v. Hetfield, 4 F. (2d) 245 (1925), rev'g. Hetfield v. Barber, 2 F. (2d)
723 (1924). The Ware and Wylly cases, in which the opinions by Judge Lowell,
though most readable, display an entire want of understanding or sympathy for
the Comptroller General's position, were affirmed, 5 F. (2d) 964 (1925). No con-
sideration was given to the administrative advantages of set-offs in collecting
debts due the Government, the Court saying, as in Smith v. Jackson, supra note
59, that they could only be recovered by suit in the absence of further statutory
authority.
6Since Kendall v. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524 (1838), it had been and still is assumed by
text writers and courts that such power did not exist. FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928), 245; 18 R. C. L. (1929) Mandamus,
§§ 6-8, p. 92; concurring opinion of Catron, J., in Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497,
520 (184 o); Barber v. Hetfield, 4F. (2d) 245 (1925), rev'g. Hetfield v. Barber, 2 F. (2d)
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from these decisions, since he had disagreed with the Comptroller
General on the merits, and perhaps was not displeased with the
result. Similar action folldwed in two cases in the District of Columbia
courts, whose power to act is not disputed. 4 On the other hand, the
Comptroller General has been supported or protected in these same
courts where he was not in conflict with the Department of Justice,65
with the exception of one unique case where the outcome was incon-
clusive.6 But as has been indicated, claims which he had disallowed
have been allowed in the Court of Claims,67 where he is helpless, and
department heads have defied him on various matters. Even Congress,
whose agent he purports to be, has displayed something less than
enthusiasm for his work, by passing relief acts,68 by making the de-
723 (1924) ;United States ex rel. Margulies & Sons v. McCarl, io F. (2d) 1012 (1926);
James Howden & Co. v. Standard Shipbuilding Corp., 17 F. (2d) 530 (1927);
Brumback v. Denman, Mem. (N. D., West. Div., Ohio, decided June 5, 1933);
and even Judge Lowell seems to have changed his mind, see Scanlan v. Hurley
and McCarl (Dist. Mass., original petition for mandamus dismissed by District
Judge Lowell, Feb. 7, 1933; amended petition dismissed, April 14, 1933). And
Smith v. Jackson, supra note 59, afforded no precedent, for there the District
Court had specifically found statutory authority to issue the writ in the act gov-
erning the Canal Zone, Act of August 24, 1912, C. 390, § 8; 37 STAT. 565. Cf. Wright
v. Ynchausti, 272 U. S. 64o (1926); Posados v. Manila, 274 U. S. 41o (1926).
"McCarl v. Cox, 8 F. (2d) 669 (1925); McCarl v. Pence, i8 F. (2d) 8o9 (1927).
In view of the Attorney General's statement that he could not certify that he
thought the lower court was in error, and, indeed, thought the Comptroller
General's position not maintainable, certiorari was denied, 270 U. S. 652 (1926).
Accord: Baker v. McCarl, 24 F. (2d) 897 (1928); McCarl v. Loud, 38 F. (2d) 943
(1930); McCarl v. Emerson, 38 F. (2d) 944 (193o); McCarl v. Orcutt, ibid.
6United States ex rel. Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. I (1927);
St. Louis, B. &. M. Ry. Co. v. United States, 268 U. S. 169, 174 (1925); United
States ex rd. L. Margulies & Sons v. McCarl, io F. (2d) 1012 (1926), cert. denied,
273 U. S. 696 (1926); McCarl v. Walters, 38 F. (2d) 942 (930); McCarl v. United
States ex rel. Leland, 42 F. (2d) 346 (930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 839 (1930);
McCarl v. Rogers, 48 F. (2d) 1023 (I93i); McCarl v. Hoeppel, 68 F. (2d) 440
(I933).
6Richmond, F. & P. R. Co. v. McCarl, 62 F. (2d) 203 (1932), where at the
request of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Comptroller General set off
mail pay admittedly due the carrier against a sum fixed by the Commission as due
the United States under the "recapture" clause of the Transportation Act of
192o. The Supreme Court of the District upheld the Comptroller General, saying
the railroad had an adequate remedy in a three-judge court to set aside the Com-
mission's order, or in the Court of Claims. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
order was not final and must be sued upon, but since such a suit had been begun
while the present case was pending, an injunction was denied without prejudice.
At this stage the "recapture" clause was repealed by the Emergency Transporta-
tion Act, 1933, and refunds of amounts already paid in were ordered.
67Supra note 45.
6 For instances, see BENSON, op. cit. supra note i, at 29.
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termination of other officers conclusive upon him in special cases,6 9
and by generally failing to act on his recommendations for legisla-
tion.
7 0
We come now to Miguel v. McCarl,7 a and what it may hold for the
future. The petitioner here, having served thirty years as an enlisted
Philippine Scout, was retired by a War Department order under
statutes generally applicable to the army. The army disbursing officer
in the Philippines having some doubt as to the legality of the retire-
ment allowances to him, forwarded a voucher with a request (author-
ized by the Dockery Act) for an advance opinion from the Comp-
troller General, who replied that payment was "not authorized even
by the remotest implication of the laws" and kept the voucherOb.
By this action a series of previous decisions respecting the status of
Philippine Scouts was in effect reversed"'. The War Department
then made a departmental reference of the matter to the Court of
Claims, and while this was pending, Miguel in 1932 brought suit in
the Supreme Court of the District for mandatory injunction to
compel the Comptroller General to return the voucher, to compel the
Chief of Finance in the War Department (who is not bonded) to
order his subordinate disbursing officer (who is) to pay it, and to
restrain the Comptroller General from interfering in any way with
the payment of that or any similar future vouchers. The then Attor-
ney General, Mr. Mitchell, learning that the Judge Advocate General,
acting for the Chief of Finance, contemplated supporting the peti-
tioner, asserted his department's right to control the defense of a suit
against the United States for the withdrawal of public money from
the Treasury.71 The Supreme Court of the District decided in favor
of the petitioner as to both officials,72 and was reversed as to both
by the Court of Appeals, 3 which sustained the Comptroller General's
position that injunction should not issue since the act was discre-
tionary, the petitioner's right doubtful under the law, and his remedy
GSuch as the determining of veterans' service records under the Adjusted
Compensation Acts, the award and interpretation of air mail contracts, and con-
tracts for military and naval aircraft. Brief for Comptroller General in Miguel v.
McCarl, pp. 15-17. Similarly as to veterans' payments under the Economy Act of
March 20, 1933, c. 5; 48 STAT. 9.
70ANN. REP. CoMP. GEN., 1928, p. I.
HaSupra note 4.
70bll CoMP. GEN. 275 (1932).
WCCSee 4 ComP. GEN. 82 (1924) and 3 CoMp. GEN. 132 (1923) and cases there
cited.
7 1Brief for Comp. Gen., Miguel v. McCarl, p. 9.
72Memorandum opinions, unreported, June io and July 16, 1932.
1166 F. (2d) 564 (1933).
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clear in the Court of Claims.7 4 By the time the case reached the Su-
preme Court, a new administration was in office. Solicitor General
Biggs, reversing his department's position, transferred his allegiance
to the petitioner and the War Department. Mr. Justice Sutherland,
writing the Court's decision, reviewed the merits and sustained the
decision as to the Chief of Financd:'-
".... the duty of the disbursing officer to pay the voucher in
question 'is so plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt and
equivalent to a positive command', and, therefore, is 'so far
ministerial that its performance may be compelled by man-
damus' ... It seems unnecessary to add that this duty cannot
be affected by a contrary decision of the Comptroller General."
It seems unnecessary to add that this last sentence entirely begs the
principal issue in the whole case.
As to theComptroller General, since his was an advance decision
given by request and not on his own initiative, and negative in form,78
the conclusion was reached that 
7 7
"The view.., that a mandatory injunction will lie to compel a
return of that voucher... and to enjoin the Comptroller General
from any interference ... has not, in the light of the case now
made, met with the concurrence of a majority of this court...
But it is not to be supposed that, upon having his attention
called to our decision, the Comptroller General will care to retain
possession of the voucher or that he will interfere in any way
with its payment".
Whether this be "monitory or minatory",78 the result is clear. A
new remedy by mandamus is available in the courts of the District
of Columbia to any claimant for money against the government who
74It has been familiar doctrine, moreover, that extraordinary writs should not
be granted where the effect is merely to give a money judgment. See Parkersburg
v. Brown, io6 U. S. 487, 5oo (1882).
7"291 U. S. 442, 454, citing and quoting Wilbur v. United States, 281 U. S. 206,
218-219 (I931).
7 Compare the rule in railroad regulation that the courts will not review purely
negative orders denying relief or permission. Chief Justice White's generalization
in Procter & Gamble v. United States, 225 U. S. 282, 293 (1912), that the court
has "jurisdiction only to entertain complaints as to affirmative orders of the
Commission", was elaborated into an argument that to do otherwise would be to
render a declaratory judgment, in Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. United States, 280
U. S. 469 (1930). Cf. I. C. C. v. Humboldt S. S. Co., 224 U. S. 474 (1912); United
States v. New River Co., 265 U. S. 533 (1924); United States v. Los Angeles R. R.,
273 U. S. 299 (1927); Alton Ry. v. United States, 287 U. S. 229 (1932).
77291 U. S. 442 at 456.
"8The phrase is Commissioner Hall's, dissenting from a decision of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission which similarly attempted to persuade without
commanding, Lake Cargo Coal Rates, 1925, 126 1. C. C. 3o9, 39o (1927).
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can allege, first, that his right is so clear that the duty to pay is
ministerial, and second, that an appropriation is available to pay it.
There is thus added another way of proceeding against the United
States in a court, without its consent,7 9 by the device of compelling
an officer to perform his statutory duty in a particular manner.8 0
This remedy has two important advantages from the claimant's
point of view. If he wins the case he gets the cash immediately with-
out waiting for Congress to appropriate for judgments of the Court
of Claims.8' And it short-circuits the Comptroller General completely,
enabling department heads with the concurrence of the Attorney
General and the courts to decide for themselves whether payments
should be made. It may confidently be predicted, as Mr. Justice
Nelson foresaw, that resort to mandamus for this purpose will be-
come increasingly common. Of course, the Comptroller General
has still a theoretical recourse; he can disallow such payments as those
of Miguel when they come to him for final settlement, and can refuse
to honor further requisitions for advances of funds to the disbursing
officers who made them. But the recourse is illusory. In the first case,
he might be compelled by mandamus to grant the disbursing officer
credit for the payment unless he could convince the courts on the
merits of his position in each instance; whereas the very core of his
contention at present is that, so far as the executive is concerned,
the Comptroller General has the last word. And in the second case,
79In other fields it has been said that although the United States is not a named
party, an action is one against it where the individual respondents have no per-
sonal interest, and where the United States is "the only real party against which
alone, in fact, the relief is asked, and against which the judgment or decree
effectively operates." In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 44 3, 5
o6 (1887); Minnesota v. Hitch-
cock, 185 U. S. 373,386-387 (1902).
8°It seems clear that where the duty is the construction of statutes, the distinc-
tion between "discretionary" acts which will not be compelled by mandamus to
be exercised in a particular way, U. S. ex reZ. Lisle v. Lynch, 137 U. S. 280, 287
(I8go); U. S. ex rel. Chicago G. W. R. Co. v. I. C. C., 294 U. S. 50 (1935); and
"ministerial" acts which may be coerced, Wilbur v. United States, 281 U. S. 206,
218-2i9 (I93I); Roberts v. United States, 170 U. S. 221, 231 (19OO); Lane v.
Hoglund, 244 U. S. i74, 18i (917); Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U. S. 3o6, 318 (1930),
all of which were relied upon by Mr. Justice Sutherland, is a distinction resting
mainly upon "an inarticulate major premise".
8'This advantage was urged by counsel for Miguel, together with the supposed
uncertainty of the Congressional appropriation, supra note 44a, as a reason why
the legal remedy afforded by the Tucker Act was not adequate and so justified
equitable jurisdiction. This was accepted by the Court, citing Smith v. Jackson,
supra note 59, although in Williams v. United States, 289 U. S. 553, 56o (1933), a
judge of the Court of Claims, suing for salary diminished by the Economy Act of
1932, was excused for bringing the suit in the Court of Claims of which he was a
member on the ground that "no other court or remedy was open to him".
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he could not venture by withholding funds to bring the functioning
of an entire bureau or establishment to a standstill as a means of
coercing a recalcitrant department head.82 To do so would be the
likeliest way to test the validity of the President's removal power,
and would put the principal burden of suffering on innocent by-
standers, lesser government employees and the public they serve.
To summarize this review of the Comptroller General's position,
he has, it is true, under the procedure laid out in the Budget and
Accounting Act a far stronger grip on the audit and control of rou-
tine governmental expenditures than has ever been exercised before,
and this has resulted both directly and indirectly in considerable
savings of public funds. By a variety of devices not fore een or
appreciated when the Act was passed, the essential principle upon
which the Act was designed, to wit, complete and exclusive Congres-
sional control of all withdrawals of public money from the Treasury
through the two agencies of the General Accounting Office and the
Court of Claims, has in practice been substantially endangered.
If it be desired to reassert that control, which is, surely, the logical
conclusion to be drawn from our constitutional separation of powers,
new legislation will be needed. 3 Such legislation to be adequate to
the purpose, would need to include at least the following provisions:
(i) withdraw, or at least greatly restrict, the jurisdiction of any
federal court to issue mandamus or injunction to any federal officer
in any case involving any claim for the payment of public moneys out
of the Treasury;" (2) prohibit the Attorney General specifically from
rendering any opinion for the guidance of any department head
or disbursing officer on any question involving a similar claim; (3)
repeal Section 148 of the Judicial Code, which gives the Court of
Claims jurisdiction over questions involving claims by reference from
department heads; and (4) permit the Comptroller General to defend,
or at least to intervene as of right in all cases involving claims for
"In granting this power to the Comptroller, the Dockery Act lodged in the
Secretary of the Treasury a power to overrule him, Act of July 31, 1894, c. 174,
§ 12; 28 STAT. 209. There seems to be some doubt whether the Comptroller General
would be subject to the same review.
"Unless the courts should be more sparing in their exercise of the power of
mandamus against the spending officers than the Miguel case promises.
"Under the provisions of the Economy Act of June 3o , 1932, c. 314, § I1; 47
STAT. 382,402,
"No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction of any suit against
the United States or (unless brought by the United States) against any officer,
agency, or instrumentality of the United States arising out of the application
of any provision of this title, unless such suit involves the Constitution of
the United States."
Cf. Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (I934).
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money against the United States and based upon an existing appro-
priation act, whether in the Court of Claims or in the lower federal
courts in the exercise of their concurrent jurisdiction. And it is not
unlikely that experience with such a system might develop further
leaks, as the tax laws do, which would have to be plugged at some
later time. This much at least seems essential8.
A lurking skepticism remains in the mind of this writer, however,
whether experience with such a system (assuming it to have been
adopted) might not also develop further doubts as to the desirability
of the system itself. It may be that all this administrative resistance
to a completely independent control of expenditures, all this burst
of activity in the courts when the accounting officers disagree with
the executive, does not spring entirely from deviltry or a reckless de-
sire to waste public funds. It may be partly the expression of the felt
necessities of efficient administration in a society where administra-
tion assumes an importance beyond the dreams of the separators of
powers,88 of a desire in the courts to keep the peace by playing umpire
or by asserting their own superior authority as a preferable alternative
to a deadlock that might result from a conflict between "executive"
and "legislative" agents. But if that is the case, a recasting of the
accounting system would be only part and parcel of a wider reorgani-
zation, possibly along lines suggested by British experience, that
would emphasize the growing centralization of executive power and
the dependence of the legislature upon it. Constitutional as well as
statutory changes would be needed. It would seem prudent before
accepting that alternative, with its revolutionary implications, to
test the efficacy of Congressional control further by giving it the
benefit of a fairer trial than it now has. The present division of au-
thority and responsibility among the Comptroller General, the
Attorney General, the other department heads, the Court of Claims,
and the courts of the District of Columbia, obstructs Congressional
control without pointing to anything better and promotes neither
economy nor efficiency.
sIt may also be found that instead of a definition of the Comptroller General's
powers in terms of those of his predecessors', as was done in the Budget and Ac-
counting Act, it would be more satisfactory to enact a complete restatement of his
powers and repeal the previous acts. See supra note 24.
"'But as a partial answer to this, it must be at once conceded that the chief
sources of this "administrative resistance" are, as they always have been, the
War and Navy departments, the scope of whose functions has expanded less
than most of the other departments.
